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Abstract 
The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command procured the riverine command 
boat (RCB) under a General Services Administration multiple-award schedule 
contract. Four factors made this acquisition successful. First, an urgent requirement 
was identified. The global war on terrorism precipitated the need for a fast, 
maneuverable, highly lethal, and globally deployable naval riverine craft. Second 
was the ready availability of a proven commercial product; the RCB is a successful 
Swedish product. Third, the cost was within a procurement threshold that allowed its 
rapid acquisition. Fourth, funding was available. The approvals of the Bob Stump 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2003 and the Ronald 
Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 were the key legislative elements that enabled 
the RCB’s swift acquisition and relaxed procurement restrictions, and allowed 
warfighters access to systems such as the RCB.  
Though this procurement satisfied immediate naval requirements, readiness 
shortfalls later revealed that the acquisition had failed to address the life-cycle 
management of maintenance and sustainability. This MBA project analyzes 
shortfalls in the process used to acquire the RCB and recommends improvements in 
life-cycle management, as it pertains to acquisition, maintenance, and sustainability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH A.
In this project, we seek to improve the readiness and life-cycle sustainment of 
weapon systems procured through rapid acquisition. We evaluate how the Navy 
used rapid acquisition to procure riverine command boats (RCBs) in 2007, and find a 
correlation between the acquisition strategy the Navy employed and the readiness 
problems experienced after Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
received the boats. We examine ways to improve the current rapid-acquisition 
strategy, with a focus on maintenance and supportability. In our research, we ask 
the following questions: 
 Why did supply-system support and maintenance problems arise after 
procurement? 
 Did the RCBs have proper provisioning and allowancing?  
 What could have been done differently about support and maintenance 
by changes in provisioning and allowancing?  
 Are there alternative ways of supporting RCBs?  
 BACKGROUND B.
1. History 
The U.S. Navy has fielded some type of riverine capability in every conflict in 
which it has engaged (Benbow, Ensminger, Swartz, Savitz, & Stimpson, 2006). 
Historically, naval riverine operations are conducted jointly with the Army or Coast 
Guard. After a major conflict, the Navy customarily stands down its riverine units; 
nevertheless, the Navy has always equipped, trained, and maintained a strong force 
in time of need (Benbow et al., 2006).  
In 2005, the Global War On Terrorism Working Group identified the need for a 
naval riverine and expeditionary capability. During this time, the Navy was seeking 
ways to accomplish riverine missions in Iraq. Riverine Command Group One was 
established when Fleet Forces Command issued an order for every naval riverine 
force to be deployed in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). As a result, 
three riverine squadrons were organized, putting the United States Navy back in the 
riverine business for the first time since the Vietnam War (Benbow et al., 2006). 
2. Command Organization 
In January 2006, Fleet Forces Command established the NECC as the single 
functional command responsible for all Navy expeditionary forces. One of the 10 
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component commands of the NECC is the Coastal Riverine Force (CRF), composed 
of Riverine Command Groups One and Two, which are responsible for the seven 
coastal riverine squadrons (CRSs; see Figure 1). 
Each CRS consists of over 300 active and reserve sailors and a complement 
of 12 riverine boats: four assault boats (RABs), six patrol boats (RPBs), and two 
command boats (RCBs), as shown in Figure 2.  
  
Figure 1. Riverine Chain of Command 
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Figure 2. Boats Constituting a Riverine Squadron  
(Thompson, 2011)  
3. Riverine Command Boat Requirements 
In November 2006, Commander Riverine Group One (CRG-1) released a list 
of requirements to Program Executive Office Ships (PMS325G) for what would 
become the RCB. CRG-1 needed a boat to serve as a liaison between commanders 
onshore and the smaller RABs and RPBs on the river. Besides specific military 
functions not available on commercial, civilian craft, three key requirements had to 
be met by the RCB. First, it had to be portable over land by military trucks such as 
the M1088 or MTVR-A1 five-ton, fifth-wheel tractor. Second, the boat had to meet a 
cruising speed of 35 knots and a sprint speed with full combat load of 40 knots. It 
needed to turn 180 degrees within two boat lengths and accelerate from 0–25 knots 
in 15 seconds.  
Third, the boat needed to endure 24-hour missions and 600–1000 hours of 
operation a year. It had to have a range of 250–300 nautical miles and the ability to 
handle sea-state-2 conditions.  
These requirements drove the acquisition process. Figure 3 lists the RCB 
characteristics of the boat selected. 
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Figure 3. Riverine Command Boat  
(Thompson, 2011) 
4. Acquisition 
Three agencies collaborated in the RCB acquisition: the NECC, the Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Program Executive Office (PEO) Ships 
PMS325G, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center–Carderock Combatant Craft 
Division (NSWCCD). The requirements for the boat first originated from end users, 
as represented by NECC, and were communicated to the program manager 
responsible for procurement, PMS325G. PMS325G worked with the Combatant 
Craft Division (CCD), who provided testing, life-cycle support, and management of 
boat inventory. The NSWCCD worked closely with NECC users and industry before, 
during, and after weapon-system acquisition, focusing on three areas: research and 
development, acquisition, and in-service engineering (Thomas, Reeves, & 
Desroches, 2009). The CCD was responsible for the life-cycle support of the new 
boats. Figure 4 illustrates the relationships among the involved agencies.  
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Figure 4. Synchronization of RCB Development 
The CCD works with a customer to determine whether its requirements can 
be met by existing assets, or whether a new system needs to be procured. The CCD 
may use existing inventories “as is” or apply engineering solutions to meet 
requirements. If nothing suitable is in stock, the CCD works with the customer and 
industry providers to find a solution that meets Navy needs, then works with 
PMS325G to procure it (Thomas, Reeves, & Desroches, 2009).  
In August 2006, NECC, which was responsible for standing up riverine 
squadrons, signed a memorandum of understanding with PMS325G (Copsey, 2009) 
to become the program office for RCB procurement. PMS325G handles the non-
ACAT acquisitions of small boats, based on mission needs and operational 
requirements (Coughlin, 2011), and specializes in using General Service 
Administration (GSA) multiple-award schedule (MAS) contracts to procure 
commercially-available boats that fit customer requirements (Coughlin, 2011).  
The CCD began its research on riverine craft between 2006 and 2007. The 
Swedish-designed, high-speed combat boat CB-90, built in the United States by 
Safe Boat International, was a possible solution. Originally developed in the late 
1980s, this boat has been used by several countries, in various design formats, for 
military and commercial uses. The CCD ordered the first RCB, and the RCB was 
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awarded as a sole-source contract to Safe Boats International at a cost of $2.3 
million in September 2007. Designated RCB-X, it was delivered to CCD in 
December 2007 for operational testing and evaluation (Coughlin, 2011).  
Once the RCB-X was found acceptable, RCBs for operational use by the 
NECC squadrons were put on contract and ordered by PMS325G. They were on 
contract before the delivery of RCB-X to the CCD, as PMS25G ordered the first RCB 
in June 2007. Additional funding for a second RCB was required and provided 
through a congressional supplement. This RCB was delivered in August 2008. In 
April 2008, the final five RCBs were ordered, with deliveries between July 2009 and 
December 2010 (C. E. Rozicer, personal communication, May 1, 2012). 
That the RCBs were procured before the CCD completed testing and that the 
CCD did not establish an integrated logistic support (ILS) strategy for maintenance 
and sustainability proved to be concerns, as is discussed in the following sections.  
5. Maintenance Supportability 
The RCBs came to the fleet without an established maintenance program. 
Maintenance was initially conducted by end users, working with OEM manuals and 
repair parts. In January 2011, the CCD generated maintenance-requirement cards 
(MRCs) and maintenance index pages (MIPs), followed by a class-maintenance plan 
(CMP) in February 2013. The CMP covers all maintenance requirements for the 
RCB. It was published more than five years after the RCB-X was first delivered. 
 Safe Boat, the original-equipment manufacturer (OEM), was responsible for 
providing maintenance training and procedures to the end user. Accordingly, the 
RCB units sent personnel on temporary duty to a three-week training session at 
which Safe Boat provided operator training, equipment familiarization, and basic 
craft maintenance (R. Cooley, personal communication, August 28, 2013). Safe Boat 
also provided a commercial repair kit for scheduled and corrective maintenance. 
Once these kits were exhausted, the unit ordered repair parts and kits directly 
through the OEM (D. Ellington, personal communication, August 9, 2013).  
Under this ad-hoc system, readiness problems began to develop, indicating 
there were difficulties with maintenance supportability. First, the operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO) of the craft soon overwhelmed the maintenance capabilities of OEM-
trained personnel. As increases in OPTEMPO accelerated normal wear and tear, 
repair and maintenance needs raised beyond what personnel had been trained to 
repair. This led to downtime as units waited for OEM technical representatives to 
conduct repairs (R. Cooley, personal communication, August 28, 2013).  
Personnel training itself became an issue. The Navy customarily trains sailors 
to a certain technical level before sending them to the fleet. Armed with knowledge 
and limited experience, sailors report to the fleet and work in an assigned billet. In 
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the case of the RCB, sailors were sent to training after reporting to the unit (R. 
Cooley, personal communication, August 28, 2013). This had repercussions on 
manning, because units had to pull from within and make manning sacrifices to 
satisfy training requirements. This was especially difficult for units preparing for 
deployment or on deployment that could not afford compromises.  
These factors—the lack of adequate maintenance support, the increased 
OPTEMPO, and insufficient training—limited the availability of the RCBs and 
delayed mission readiness. 
6. Sustainment Strategy 
Besides lacking a maintenance strategy, the RCB had no adequate life-cycle 
sustainment strategy. Despite the CCD’s collaboration with NECC, significant life-
cycle functions went unaddressed. First, initial outfitting and allowance for repairs or 
stock parts was nonexistent. Thus, when a part was needed, it was open purchased 
through a commercial vendor, using a government credit card, or by a contract 
through the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC). Second, there was no mechanism to track 
demand for repair parts, because an open purchased repair part circumvents the 
supply system. Had the parts been requisitioned through the supply system, each 
demand would have been recorded and the data used to determine future stocking. 
As data accumulated, it would have accurately indicated which items a unit should 
carry to support deployment. Because data was not recorded, it was impossible to 
forecast requirements accurately, and readiness suffered (K. E. Doyne, personal 
communication, May 2, 2012).1  
 BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH C.
This project improves the acquisition process used by warfighters in unknown 
environments by reviewing the rapid-procurement and life-cycle processes for the 
RCB and by considering alternative approaches. We review the life-cycle-logistics 
functions of supply-system support, provisioning, and allowancing, and propose an 
improved rapid-acquisition process. 
For this research, we collected data from riverine-squadron subject-matter 
experts (SMEs) at Naval Sea Logistics Support Center and various entities in the 
supply system, including Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and RCB 
users. The scope of this research is confined to the rapid acquisition of the RCB 
platform and its effects on cost and readiness. A dearth of repair records and supply-
requisition histories limited this inquiry.  
                                            
1 This personal e-mail communication from NAVSEA SME Keith Doyne was received on May 2, 2012. 
Mr. Doyne shared an e-mail originating from RDML Lewis, PEO Ships, to RADM Heinrich, NAVSUP, 
discussing the RCB logistics support. 
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 METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION D.
We first interviewed various stakeholders in order to understand the problem, 
focusing on end users from NECC and riverine squadrons that suffered readiness 
problems. To yield qualitative and quantitative data, we interviewed SMEs from the 
program-management offices, PEO Ships, as to why certain procurement decisions 
were made and what corrections were attempted. 
We analyzed the data to identify hurdles that reduced material readiness and 
to generate recommendations, for example, recommendations for improvements in 
tracking the demand for open purchased items. In the future, the availability of 
historical demand data for routinely procured items can be expected to result in 
appropriate allowancing decisions.  
This report is organized along three lines of inquiry: how RCB readiness was 
compromised by deficiencies in the rapid-acquisition process; by the lack of focus on 
maintenance supportability; and by an inadequate life-cycle-sustainment plan. The 
central topics explored are acquisition, maintenance, and sustainment. Chapter I 
begins with a look at the organizational structure involved, and Chapter II processes 
this information. In Chapter III, we discuss how information is organized and used to 
develop the approach for analysis found in Chapter IV. Recommendations are in 
Chapter V.  
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II. REVIEW OF LAWS, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES 
 INTRODUCTION A.
The 9/11 attack significantly changed how the nation supplies the warfighter’s 
requirements. In the aftermath of this crisis, laws were amended to streamline 
communications between combatant commanders and acquisition offices, and the 
burdensome process for supplying the warfighter was eased. The RCB was one of 
many rapid acquisitions made as the DoD ramped up the war on terrorism. Studying 
the process by which the RCB was acquired illuminates how a new rapid-acquisition 
capability brought mixed results: both immediate advantage to the warfighter and 
deficient life-cycle-maintenance structures. A formal maintenance doctrine for the 
RCB was never written, and the result was that of inconsistent practices in the 
squadrons. The problem was not addressed until the publication of a class-
maintenance plan (CMP) in February 2013, which standardized maintenance 
requirements and periodicities (NAVSEA, 2013a). 
There was no opportunity within the rapid-acquisition process to address 
sustainment issues. Just as maintenance requirements were not considered in the 
procurement, there was no sustainment plan to ensure that units remained 
operational. This oversight decreased readiness in practical ways. There were no 
initial allowancing and stock levels; units were forced to rely solely on commercial 
vendors, with no organic supply-system support, and there was no formal tracking of 
supplies to monitor demand and inventory levels.  
 THE ACQUISITION PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION B.
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is the DoD’s formal system for 
acquisition and follows guidelines set forth in the DoD 5000 series first released in 
1971. It is a milestone-driven, low-risk process that focuses on cost, schedule, and 
performance. The goal at the end of the DAS process is to have weapon systems 
that are supportable and affordable throughout their life cycle. Under the DAS, 
considerations for the support of a weapon system begin at the start of the 
acquisition process, which may take 12–25 years to field a system (Farmer, 2012). 
The initial procurement of the RCB started in 2008 under the abbreviated 
acquisition program (R. Jones, personal communication, NSWCCD, August 9, 
2013). This program was designed for small DoN acquisitions that did not require 
operational testing and evaluation (OT&E) and were within specific dollar thresholds, 
namely, 
 development ( < $10 million), and 
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 production or services (< $25 million per year or < $50 million per year 
total; Office of the Secretary of the Navy [SECNAV], 2011a). 
Before further discussion of the RCB acquisition, it is important to understand 
briefly the DoD procurement system and how exactly the RCB fits in. The DAS is 
one of three processes that weapon-system procurements must go through. All 
weapon systems procured by the DoD must meet a specific military requirement, as 
determined by the joint-capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS) 
process; must be funded as part of the federal budget through the planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process; and must be procured 
through the DAS (Schwartz, 2013).  
1. Joint Capabilities Integrated and Development System 
All DoD requirements are vetted through the JCIDS process. The JCIDS was 
created in 2003 as a shift from the previous threat-based, service-driven 
identification model known as the requirements-generation system (RGS), to favor a 
joint capability-based approach (Schwartz, 2013). The purpose of the JCIDS is to 
review service capability requirements at a joint level, identify whether capability 
gaps exist, and determine whether a material solution is required. Redundancy is 
eliminated and resources are used efficiently with a joint, as opposed to a service-
level, review. If a material solution is required, the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Committee (JROC) will approve an initial-capabilities document (ICD). The approved 
ICD then justifies a requirement, and the need proceeds to the DAS process 
(Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2012). 
2. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
The funding for a weapon system occurs in the PPBE process. In the 
planning phase, the requirements received from combatant commands are 
analyzed. In the programming phase, proposed programs are presented in a 
program-objective memorandum (POM) for review and integration into the budget. 
Budgeting happens concurrently with the programming phase and results in a 
budget decision that is approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
Simultaneous with the program and budget phase is the execution phase, where 
programs are evaluated under performance metrics, which may result in a budget 
adjustment. 
3. Defense Acquisition System 
In the DAS, each acquisition program is managed by a program manager 
(PM). For the RCB, the PM is PMS325G, falling under NAVSEA PEO Ships. 
PMS325G manages all small-boat programs, including the RCB. Programs are 
divided into acquisition categories (ACATs) according to their dollar value. For 
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example, as shown in Table 1, the dollar value for the RCB program places it below 
ACAT IV in the abbreviated acquisition program, with PEO Ships having authority for 
the procurement decision.  
Table 1. ACAT Description and Decision 1 Authority   
(SECNAV, 2011a, p. 1-23) 
Table E1T1 Description and Decision Authority for 




ACAT I  Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) (10 U.S.C. 
§2430) 
 RDT&E total expenditure > $365 million in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2000 constant dollars, or 
 Procurement total expenditure > $2.190 billion in FY 
2000 constant dollars, or 
ACAT ID: USD(AT&L) 
ACAT IC: SECNAV, or 
if delegated, 
ASN(RD&A) as the CAE 
(not further 
delegable)
ACAT IA 1/  Major Automated Information Systems (MAISs) 
 Program costs/year (all appropriations) > $32 million 
in FY 2000 constant dollars, or 
 Total program costs > $126 million in FY 2000 constant 
dollars, or 
 Total life-cycle costs > $378 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars 
 MDA designation as special interest
ACAT IAM: USD(AT&L), 
or designee 
ACAT IAC: SECNAV, or 
if delegated, 
ASN(RD&A), as the CAE 
(not further
ACAT II  Does not meet the criteria for ACAT I 
 Major Systems (10 U.S.C. §2302(5)) 
 RDT&E total expenditure > $140 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars, or 
 Procurement total expenditure > $660 million in FY 
2000 constant dollars, or 
 ASN(RD&A) designation as special interest 
 Not applicable to IT system programs
ASN(RD&A), or the 
individual designated 
by ASN(RD&A) 
ACAT III  Does not meet the criteria for ACAT II or above 
 Weapon system programs: 
 RDT&E total expenditure ≤ $140 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars, or 
 Procurement total expenditure ≤ $660 million in FY 
2000 constant dollars, and 
 Affects mission characteristics of ships or aircraft 
or combat capability 
 IT system programs: 
 Program costs/year ≥ $15 million ≤ $32 million in FY 
2000 constant dollars, or 
 Total program costs ≥ $30 million ≤ $126 million in FY 
Cognizant PEO, SYSCOM 
commander, DRPM, or 
designated flag 





programs not assigned 
to a PEO, SYSCOM, or 
DRPM. 
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ACAT IVT  Does not meet the criteria for ACAT III or above 
 Requires operational test and evaluation 
 Weapon system programs: 
 RDT&E total expenditure ≤ $140 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars, or 
 Procurement total expenditure ≤ $660 million in FY 
2000 constant dollars 
 IT system programs: 
 Program costs/year < $15 million, or 
 Total program costs < $30 million, or 
 Total life-cycle costs ≤ $378 million in FY 2000
Cognizant PEO, SYSCOM 
commander, DRPM, or 
designated flag 
officer, SES 




programs not assigned 
to a PEO, SYSCOM, or 
DRPM. 
ACAT IVM  Does not meet the criteria for ACAT III or above 
 Does not require operational test and evaluation as 
concurred with by OTA 
 Weapon system programs: 
 RDT&E total expenditure ≥ $10 million ≤ $140 million 
in FY 2000 constant dollars, or 
 Procurement expenditure ≥ $25 million/year, ≥ $50 
million total ≤ $660 million total in FY 2000 constant 
dollars 
Cognizant PEO, SYSCOM 
commander, DRPM, or 
designated flag 
officer, SES 







 Does not meet the criteria for ACAT IV or above 
 Does not require operational test and evaluation as 
concurred with in writing by OTA 
 Weapon system programs: 
 Development total expenditure < $10 million, and 
 Production or services expenditure < $25 million/year, 
< $50 million total 
 IT system programs: 
 Program costs/year < $15 million, and 
Cognizant PEO, SYSCOM 
commander, DRPM, or 
designated flag 
officer, SES 





1/ In some cases, an ACAT IA program, as defined above, also meets the dollar threshold 
definition of an MDAP. Per DoD Instruction 5000.02 of 8 Dec 2008, enclosure 3, table 1, footnote 
1, the statutory requirements that apply to MDAPs or MAIS programs shall apply to such programs, 
as designated by the Secretary of Defense. Public Law 111-84 of 28 Oct 2009, section 817, 
subsections (a) and (b), (FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act), amended section 2445d of 
title 10, U.S.C., whereby the Secretary of Defense may, as a general rule, designate a MAIS 
program that requires the development of customized hardware to be treated ONLY as an MDAP under 
chapter 144 title 10, U.S.C., subject to chapter 144 MDAP requirements, and a MAIS program that 
does not require development of customized hardware to be treated ONLY as a MAIS program under 
chapter 144A of title 10, U.S.C., subject to chapter 144A MAIS program requirements.
A second function of DAS is tracking the progress of a weapon system. 
Procurements are monitored by milestones that continue throughout the life of a 
weapon system, as shown in Figure 5. At each milestone, the program is assessed 
using requirements developed by law, to determine if the acquisition can continue. 
Before a system proceeds into the production and deployment phase after Milestone 
C, it will have been scrutinized under Milestone A to ensure that appropriate 
technology was developed and under Milestone B to verify that engineering and 
manufacturing development took place (Schwartz, 2013).  
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Figure 5. Defense-Acquisition Milestones  
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2008, p. 12) 
 RAPID-ACQUISITION TOOLS C.
The shift from the traditional acquisition process to rapid acquisition is 
described in many places. Because the rapid-acquisition process was conceived to 
respond to crisis, it differs greatly from traditional acquisition under the DAS. Table 2 
shows the differences between the threat-based approach of the DAS and the 
capability approach of rapid acquisition (Farmer, 2012).  
Table 2. Traditional Vs. Rapid Acquisition  
Traditional Approach Rapid Acquisition 
 Future focused, large ACAT 
level programs 
 Driven by structured 
processes 
 Mature evolved requirements 
 Alternatives carefully 
analyzed 
 Lengthy development (12-25 
years) 
 High visibility on the program 
 Large investment 
 Immediate need focused, 
ACAT II and below programs 
 Streamlined process 
 Specific unique contingency 
requirement 
 High visibility on results 
 May transition to a normal 
acquisition program 
 75% solution acceptable 
Two major pieces of legislation provided the legal tools for rapid acquisition. 
First was the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2003, which became Public Law 107-314. Section 806 of this law, Rapid Acquisition 
and Deployment Procedures, directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to 
prescribe procedures for the rapid acquisition and deployment of items 
that are– 
1. currently under development by the Department of Defense or 
available from the commercial sector; and  
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2. urgently needed to react to an enemy threat or to respond to 
significant and urgent safety situations. (p. 151) 
Section 806 called for a streamlined communications process among the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the acquisition agencies, and research and 
development to enable combatant commanders to communicate their requirements 
quickly and to receive a fast response in terms of proposals. Section 806 also 
required updating the procedures for rapid acquisition, funding, deployment, and 
testing of systems either under development or urgently needed. 
This law was drastically amended by the Ronald Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which became Public Law 108-375. Section 
811, Rapid Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat Emergencies, greatly 
expanded what Section 806 had started. It enabled the SECDEF to immediately 
procure anything deemed “urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability 
deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities” (p. 202). With a cap of $100 million 
per fiscal year and a goal of awarding the contract within 15 days, this was the new 
face of rapid acquisition. This law also permitted the waiver of certain statutes and 
regulations. Among them was the ability to 
waive any provision of law, policy, directive or regulation addressing – 
(A) The establishment of the requirement for the equipment; 
(B) the research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment; 
or 
(C) the solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of contract, 
for the procurement of the equipment. (p. 203) 
The only thing this law did not waive was any law imposing civil or criminal 
penalties. All barriers to the SECDEF’s ability to acquire a critical requirement were 
effectively removed. But the law failed to impose sustainability requirements, and as 
procurement shifted to rapid acquisition, sustainability issues began to emerge (K. E. 
Doyne, personal communication, May 2, 2012).  
The DoD has aggressively exploited commercially available products that can 
fulfill a need or bridge a gap in weapon-system requirements. While no official tool 
for rapid acquisition was established, the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) 
contains several key provisions that were used in the acquisition of the RCB. As 
noted, the RCB used a GSA MAS contract for procurement. Despite streamlining the 
rapid-acquisition process, the requirement to use the FAR for procurement still 
exists. Codified in law by Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the 
FAR (2013) defines the rules and regulations for the acquisition of supplies and 
services by the federal government. This section lays out the tools from the FAR that 
were used for the RCB procurement.  
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1. Commercial and Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Items 
FAR 2.101 defines a commercial item as any item that may be acquired by 
the general public. A commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) item is one that is sold in 
considerable quantities in the commercial marketplace. FAR Part 12 encourages the 
DoD to contract commercial items that meet agency needs. The RCB was available 
to the public, and was thus a commercial item; it sold in sufficient quantities to be 
deemed a COTS item. 
When a government agency purchases COTS or commercial items, the 
simplified acquisitions procedure (SAP) applies. The SAP speeds up acquisition by 
reducing administrative burdens. The contractor is exempt from cost-account 
standards (CAS), in accordance with FAR 12.214. The CAS for a non-commercial 
item requires a contractor to submit certified cost and pricing data for any contract 
over $700,000, per the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA) and FAR 30.201. This causes 
an increased cost for the government because of the administrative and time burden 
in fulfilling the mandatory audit of the CAS, as required by TINA. These benefits 
allowed for a reduced acquisition time for the RCB.  
FAR Part 12 promotes the use of commercial practices when procuring COTS 
or commercial items, per Public Law 103-355. However, a commercial practice may 
restrict the contracting officer’s (KO’s) ability to negotiate items such as warranties, 
financing, use of a contractor’s quality-assurance procedures, and even technical 
data. Though the acquisition is streamlined, the KO, according to FAR Part 12, is still 
required to do many of the basic contracting steps, such as conducting market 
research, determining price reasonableness, and administering past-performance 
evaluations.  
2. Federal Supply Schedules  
The GSA MASs are long-term, indefinite-delivery contracts. FAR 8.402 allows 
federal agencies to use the GSA MASs to simplify the procurement of commercial 
items. The GSA pre-negotiates fair and reasonable prices with providers of 
commercial services and supplies. When ordering under the MAS, the process is 
already considered a full and open competition and does not require going outside 
GSA-approved contractors. This allows a KO to bypass placing a synopsis. He or 
she can go directly to Federal Business Opportunities (FEDBIZOPS) to place an 
order, reducing the acquisition time line by at least 15 days, as FAR 5.203 requires. 
The KO can issue a request for quote (RFQ) directly to those contractors with a 
GSA-scheduled contract for the item needed (General Services Administration 
[GSA], 2012), though he or she must also post the requirement on the GSA’s 
electronic bulletin board so that any approved contractor may bid, as required by 
FAR 8.402(c)(2). The price posted on the MAS is the ceiling price, and the KO may 
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negotiate a lower price. PMS325G used this process to purchase six RCBs for 
NECC.  
3. Test Program for Certain Commercial Items 
The RCB-X was purchased as a testing and evaluation platform. It cost $2.3 
million and was procured by the CCD using the authority of FAR 13.5, the test 
program for certain commercial items. This allows a contracting officer to award for 
supplies and services of commercial items that are above the SAP cost threshold, 
but under $6.5 million. Though this program opens large commercial buys for the 
DoD using the abbreviated SAP, all other SAP actions are still required from FAR 
13.1.  
4. Summary 
The DoD has increasingly used commercially-developed systems to solve 
military problems. For small- or low-cost weapon systems, the FAR has established 
several processes to assist in rapid acquisition. While not all contract tools are 
needed at the same time, the ability to employ the right acquisition method in the 
acquisition of a commercial system is paramount for success. As shown by the 
acquisition of the RCB, a rapid acquisition can be successful and promote the use of 
rapid acquisition. Further review, however, reveals flaws in how maintenance and 
life-cycle support of the RCB arose after initial procurement.  
 MAINTENANCE SUPPORTABILITY D.
1. Introduction 
Maintenance is critical to weapon-system readiness throughout a program’s 
life cycle (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2007). Operations and Support (O&S) is 
the largest component of the DAS, and it is accomplished through a command’s 
maintenance and material-management (3-M) system. This section analyzes the 3-
M system and reviews policy, processes and applications, and maintenance levels 
and tasks as they apply to the RCB. 
2. Maintenance Policy 
Maintenance requirements can be clearly traced through policies. There are 
four documents establishing RCB maintenance policy: NAVSEA 4790.8C, 
OPNAVINST 4780.6E, the Naval Ship’s Technical Manual (NSTM), and the class-
maintenance plan (CMP) for the RCB. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 17 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
a. Ships’ Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Manual 
(NAVSEAINST 4790.8C)  
The 3-M manual is the Navy’s maintenance bible, providing an overall 
standard for shipboard preventative maintenance. This includes tasks such as 
planning, scheduling, controlling, and performing (NAVSEA, 2013b). 
The 3-M manual assigns specific responsibilities to members of the 
command. The Commanding Officer is assigned overall responsibility for the 
command’s 3-M program. The XO, 3-M coordinator (3MC), department heads, and 
enlisted personnel have roles that are outlined in the 3-M manual. 
The 3-M manual provides a blueprint for a command’s program, 
outlining the functions and processes needed to establish, manage, and operate a 
successful 3-M program.  
b. Policy for Administering Service Craft and Boats in the U.S. 
Navy (OPNAVINST 4780.6E) 
Just as the 3-M manual describes a 3-M program, the 4780 is the 
CNO’s policy for the life cycle of service craft and small boats, from acquisition to 
disposal (CNO, 2006). Beginning with procurement, this document assigns NAVSEA 
responsibilities for boat acquisitions. It directs that service craft and small boats be 
allowanced appropriately through a coordinated shipboard allowance list (COSAL) 
and managed under a fleet-modernization program (FMP)—both essential 
components in life-cycle management. The COSAL ensures that equipment is 
allowed appropriate repair parts, while a key component of the FMP is the 
scheduling of regular overhauls (ROH) and scheduled material inspections. 
c. Naval Ship’s Technical Manual (NSTM) Boats & Small Craft, 
Chapter 58, 3 Volume 1 
OPNAVINST 4780.6 contains the CNO’s (2006) policy on small boats. 
NSTM Chapter 583 (NAVSEA, 2012) elaborates on procedures for CNO policy. 
Boats are formally defined and the responsibilities of PMS325 as program manager 
(PM) are stated. The publication elaborates on boat management, including aspects 
such as allowancing, transfers between command, and turn-in at life cycle’s end, 
and acknowledges COTS as an appropriate vehicle for small-boat acquisition.  
d. The Class-Maintenance Plan (CMP) 
Just as NSTM Chapter 583, Volume 1, assigns responsibility for small-
boat life-cycle management to PMS325G, PMS325G establishes the CMP as the 
source of direction on the execution of maintenance, specifically for the RCB. This 
source document is used to apply the 3-M manual to the RCB.  
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These documents trace maintenance requirements from the 3-M 
doctrine of NAVSEA and the CNO to the maintenance plan of the program manager 
and NECC.  
3. Maintenance Process and Application  
The maintenance doctrines of the 3-M manual and the RCB CMP are 
executed under three systems: 3-M schedule (SKED), the naval tactical-command 
support system (NTCSS), and the automated shore Interface (ASI) process.  
As the software interface used to obtain formalized maintenance procedures, 
3-M SKED is the backbone of the 3-M system, managed by the 3-M coordinator 
(3MC). The CMP lists systems that require maintenance actions, and it is through 3-
M SKED that keeps track of completed maintenance. Administrative functions of the 
3MC include scheduling, updating maintenance requirements, and providing 
procedures for the end user, such as the MRC cards used to perform maintenance.  
Just as the 3-M SKED system provides guidance on performing work, the 
Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS) is the system used to input 
maintenance items and document what is getting done. Maintenance items may be 
jobs completed by crewmembers at the organizational level or complex maintenance 
by shops outside the command, such as a shipyard. [Besides job inputs, parts 
orders from the system’s allowance parts list (APL) can be made through the 
NTCSS interface.  
The ASI is used to update changes in system configurations. As systems are 
updated, changes occur to the allowancing of repair parts. These changes are 
documented using the COSAL feedback report and NAVSUP is informed of the 
current configuration. NAVSUP then generates an ASI based on the update. When 
the ASI is processed by the command, the databases contained in the unit’s NTCSS 
program are updated, to align the parts on the APL with the command’s current 
configuration and adjust the allowance level.  
4. Maintenance Levels and Tasks 
Maintenance is of two types: unscheduled and scheduled. Unscheduled 
maintenance is unplanned, the result of a material failure, and results in corrective 
maintenance to get the system operational.  
Scheduled or preventive maintenance is a planned evolution of care that is 
conducted at regular intervals to maintain operability. Preventative maintenance is 
managed in accordance with in accordance with the 3-M manual through the Navy’s 
Planned Maintenance System (PMS).  
Planned maintenance is conducted at three levels of increasingly difficult 
procedures: organizational, intermediate, and depot. Organizational (O-level) 
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maintenance is the lowest performed under the PMS system. This routine shipboard 
maintenance is to keep equipment in a fully mission-capable status.  
Intermediate (I-level) maintenance requires more skills than O-level and may 
require training, resources, and equipment unavailable onsite.  
Depot (D-level) maintenance is usually completed by special-repair activities, 
and is beyond the scope of the shipboard technician. Its purpose is to repair and 
investigate the status of complex systems that are rarely accessed; thus D-level 
work requires advance scheduling to ensure availability of equipment and personnel. 
During depot maintenance, the unit may be nonoperational and subsystems 
disabled. Usually D-level maintenance is scheduled when a unit is in maintenance 
availability or shipyard overhaul. 
As an example of the proportion of repairs typical at each level, per the CMP, 
the RCB has a total of 79 maintenance items. Thirty-four are a combination of O/I 
level; 28 are I-level; and seven are D-level.  
Table 3 displays various maintenance levels as required by the CMP, with the 
system, maintenance actions, levels, man-hours and skill level required for repair. 
Table 3. RCB Maintenance Levels 















Engine Overhaul (As Per Diesel Inspection 
Results 
Engine and Marine Gear Replacement 
Driveshaft Alignment  
MPDE Muffler Removal and Installation 
Fuel-Gauge Calibration 
Fuel-Shutoff-Valve Replacement 
Emergency Fuel-Shutoff-Cable Replacement 
Fuel-Injection Fuel-Pump Replacement 
Freshwater-Coolant Pump 
Turbocharger Replacement 
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5. Maintenance Development 
The progress of RCB maintenance started with commercial support and 
evolved to organic Navy-supported maintenance. From December 2007 to January 
2011, maintenance was conducted using OEM procedures and supplies. In January 
2011, a formal 3-M process began, with the units using Navy-generated MIPs and 
MRCs (J. Lupyan, personal communication, October 10, 2013). In February 2013, 
PMS235 released a CMP, formalizing maintenance procedures for the RCB. No 
maintenance-demand data was captured for the first three years of the RCB’s 
existence. 
6. Summary 
To achieve maximal effectiveness from equipment, management tools are 
available to ensure units are performing the maintenance necessary to assure good 
condition of equipment throughout the equipment’s life cycle. In the case of the RCB, 
recipient units lacked the maintenance tools and resources needed to support the 
craft. This inability to meet maintenance standards degraded the operational 
readiness of the unit. 
 SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS E.
In the preceding review, we looked at the evolution in weapon system 
sustainment as a result of the GWOT. We cited the RCB as an example of how a 
failure in sustainment planning before acquisition affected mission readiness (H. 
Lewis, personal communication, 2012). We next review reform actions intended to 
remedy this defect. 
1. Initial Requirements 
To review, the requirements for sustainment procedures originated in DoD 
Instruction 5000.02 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008), which assigned the responsibility to the 
PM. The PM ensured a life-cycle sustainment plan was developed during the 
material-solution analysis and matured throughout the technology-development 
phase. The LCSP was a requirement for transitions into Milestone B (OUSD[AT&L]), 
2008).  
SECNAV 5000.2c (SECNAV, 2004) issued mandatory procedures for DoN 
major and minor acquisitions. The ACAT listing in Table E2T1 of the SECNAV 
instruction was expanded from the DoD ACAT listing and included the abbreviated 
acquisition programs used to procure the RCB. Additionally, the SECNAV instruction 
provided direction on the rapid deployment capability (RDC) process to respond 
rapidly to urgent requirements that may later develop in an ACAT program. 
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The Supervisor of Shipbuilding Operations Manual defines the responsibilities 
for RCB PMs, specifies the elements that comprise integrated logistics support (ILS), 
explains the role of the ILS manager, and details the provisioning and allowancing 
process.  
2. Procurement Evolution 
a. Public Law 108-375 
Following the events of 9/11, several modifications were enacted to 
enable the rapid acquisition of a critical capability. The most significant was the 
passage of Public Law 108-375 in 2005, which greatly expanded the power of the 
SECDEF to fund critical requirements. Two memos from the ASN office took 
advantage of these legislative changes. 
b. ASN Memos 
A rapid-acquisition-processing memo released from the ASN (RD&A) 
office on Dec 4, 2006, classified certain acquisitions as urgent and directed that 
procurement requests be executed within seven days of receipt. The authority cited 
was Public Law 108-375, which stated a goal of awarding a contract within 15 days 
of receiving a requirement. This ASN memo cut award time in half and called out two 
types of acquisitions from SECNAVINST 5000.2c: the abbreviated acquisition 
process (AAP) and the rapid-deployment capability (RDC). 
The RCBs were procured under the AAP, as listed in SECNAVINST 
5000.2c, on the same table as ACAT programs I–IV. The RDC, which is not listed on 
the ACAT table, was defined as a tailored approach for managing a capability that 
might later transition to an ACAT program (SECNAV, 2004).  
The ASN (RD&A) memo was updated six months later in response to 
the volume of rapid-acquisition requests received that lacked incomplete data. The 
lack of data slowed the rapid-acquisition process; the new memo required that a 
checklist accompany all RDC requests. Because an RDC program may transition to 
an ACAT program, the checklist ensured that certain details of the acquisition were 
addressed.  
Of the 11 items on the checklist, two stood out as having been 
deficiencies identified in the RCB procurement, and direction was given that logistics 
and long-term maintenance support be addressed. Had these items been addressed 
during the AAP acquisition of the RCB, much readiness fallout might have been 
avoided. Table 4 lists the specific items requiring consideration with the submission 
of an RDC acquisition request. 
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Table 4. RDC Checklist Requirements 
RDC Checklist Requirements 
Long Term Maintenance 
Requirements 
Logistics Support Requirement 
a. Logistics support plan for RDC 
supplies.  
b. Anticipated life-cycle issues 
c. Warranty provisions 
d. Demilitarization and disposal 
e. Life-cycle assessment to 
address performance, readiness, 
ownership cost and support 
issues 
f. Sustainment strategy funding 
a. Logistics support funding 
b. How will obsolescence be 
addressed 
c. Alternate logistic support 
strategies 
d. Anticipated technical refresh for 
RDC supplies 
e. Logistics workload (i.e. 
contractor, government supply 
support) 
c. Defense Science Board: Fulfillment of Urgent Operational 
Needs 
In July 2009, the Defense Science Board Taskforce released a report 
on the fulfillment of urgent operational needs. This document addressed the DoD’s 
goal of expanding the rate at which requirements were fielded. It faulted the present 
acquisition process, which was focused on deliberate acquisitions, and stated it was 
unable, in its present condition, to focus on “rapid” acquisitions.  
d. Summary of Findings 
The task force had six findings and five recommendations. The 
findings were as follows: 
1. Because the DoD needs differ with each rapid-acquisition 
requirement, using the same process for different 
requirements is ineffective. The DoD needs a completely 
different process.  
2. The acquisition workforce isn’t trained for rapid acquisition. It 
works in a traditional system of complex requirements 
requiring extreme precision and accuracy, while rapid 
acquisition demands immediate outcomes—which may be 
less than optimal. 
3. A rapid acquisition must use existing technology and 
manufacturing; targeting new technologies is time-
consuming and risky. A process for exploiting what already 
exists is needed.  
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4. DoD practices in rapid acquisition are not sustainable. The 
report criticized the use of ad-hoc practices that lacked the 
capacity to respond to future requirements. Though the 
process met initial, short-term need, it couldn’t handle the 
long term. 
5. No triage is applied in rapid acquisition. Ninety percent of the 
Army’s urgent-need requirements are not for a new 
capability, but simply for more units of equipment or for an 
item in existing inventory. There is no effective mechanism 
to identify whether an item is already available. 
6. Bureaucratic barriers impede rapid acquisition. The biggest 
barrier is access to funding.  
e. Summary of Recommendations  
The study made five recommendations:  
1. Establish a formal dual-acquisition path. The present 
procurement process is too structured and demands a 99% 
solution that requires three to 11 years before a capability 
reaches the warfighter. A dual-acquisition path would put the 
requirements in different processes to enable deployment of 
a 75% solution in 24 months. 
2. Create a rapid-acquisition fund. The study recommends a 
separate account be established to fund urgent 
requirements, similar to overseas contingency-operations 
funding (OCO). The study recommends funding of 0.5% of 
the DoD budget, with a cap of $3 billion, which would be 
replenished annually. Additionally, the study recommends 
that the funds not expire and not be limited to specific 
classifications. 
3. Form a rapid acquisition and fielding agency. The study 
recommends the formation of a joint agency within the office 
of the USD (AT&L), similar to the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) and National Security Agency (NSA). The proposed 
name is the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA). 
4. Build the new agency from existing ad-hoc rapid-
acquisition initiatives. The agency would take on existing 
programs already in progress. This would create a new 
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organization with new people looking for programs to work 
on.  
5. Adopt a streamlined approach. Pursue need, acquisition, 
and funding issues simultaneously to decrease time to 
deployment. (OUSD[AT&L], 2009) 
The report demonstrated a new emphasis on finding ways to pursue 
urgent requirements. While it focuses on exploiting existing capabilities, it does not 
talk about long-term sustainment. Because life-cycle issues are neglected, the report 
is short-term focused. 
3. Life-Cycle Issues 
Rapid-acquisition reforms resulted in fast acquisition, but poor sustainment. 
Concerns quickly ran up the chain of command to flag leadership. In an e-mail 
communication from PEO Ships, RDML Dave Lewis, to the NAVSUP Commander 
and Chief of the Supply Corps, RADM Mark Heinrich (K. E. Doyne, personal 
communication, May 2, 2012), RADM Heinrich was asked to help accelerate 
NAVICP procurement of RCB spare parts, because the RCBs were procured without 
an ILS strategy. 
In his communication, RADM Lewis described the process: PMS 325 is 
responsible for the acquisition and life-cycle support of the RCB, with the assistance 
of the CCD, who work with the end user and industry. A problem was that the 
allowance parts list (APL) wasn’t entered into the Navy supply system until 
November 2011, nearly five years after delivery of the first RCB and two years after 
the squadrons first deployed.  
Because an APL identifies the parts needed to maintain a weapons system, it 
is a critical life-cycle-management tool. When maintenance is performed and parts 
are ordered in the supply system, a demand signal is generated. Over time, as 
various parts are requisitioned, this demand data is used to establish allowance 
levels. However, because the allowance levels are generated by recording demand 
over time, it takes a while to establish accurate levels. The normal time frame to 
build an effective allowance listing is eighteen months after the APL is established.  
For the first four years of the RCB life cycle, there was no record of demand 
to establish allowances. A review of the APL data at the time of RADM Lewis’s e-
mail indicates there were only 18 national stock numbers (NSNs), and all of them 
were readily available in the supply system. 
Life-cycle logistician Jim Farmer discusses the absence of a sustainment 
focus in the rapid-acquisition process (Farmer, 2012). Farmer notes that 
incorporation of sustainment requirements resulted in deployment delays 
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unacceptable to the warfighter. The user requires a 75% solution, within the next 2–
24 months, and cannot wait for a 100% solution in 12–25 years. 
Farmer discusses requirements not readily apparent to the customer—big-
footprint items such as training, spares, maintenance, facilities, and manpower 
(Farmer, 2012). None of these concerns were raised during the procurement of the 
RCB, which was 100% commercially supported; no demand signal was recorded to 
develop allowances (K. E. Doyne, personal communication, May 2, 2012). 
Concerns with sustainment are not limited to the RCB or Navy acquisitions. 
The Army also experienced significant problems, primarily because PMs are unable 
to devote as many resources to life-cycle management as to procurement. Whitson 
uses the procurement of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) as an 
example (Whitson, 2012). Though 15,000 MRAPs were quickly fielded, which was 
determined a rapid-acquisition success, the supply chain for repair parts was full of 
gaps.  
4. Acquisition Reform 
In September 2011, the USD(AT&L) memo Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan 
(LCSP) reiterated the importance of the LCSP and confirmed that it had been 
separated from the acquisition strategy. The goal of separating the LCSP was to 
revise and improve the sustainment plan for new weapons systems, and was 
becoming a requirement for every acquisition program. This later became part of the 
revised DAG and an update to the DoDI 5000.02 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011b).  
An update followed from the SECNAV. SECNAVINST 5400.15C listed the 
PEO as responsible for all life-cycle-management programs under its cognizance. 
This instruction directed that PEOs work directly with Systems Command 
(SYSCOM) to validate technical processes, and that program managers exercise 
authority over the entire life cycle of a system, from concept development to disposal 
(SECNAV, 2011). 
5. Sustainment Review 
With the RCB requirements and issues laid out, the question arises, what 
would happen if the RCB procedure were conducted today? Would it be plagued 
with the same sustainment issues, or would the new regulations effect appropriate 
life-cycle-management decisions? Chapters I and II set the background for the RCB 
acquisition and life cycle support. In Chapters IV and V, we analyze the data and 
make recommendations to answer this and other questions. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 INTRODUCTION A.
This chapter describes the methodology used in this research—how we 
collected data, what questions we asked, and what process we used to analyze the 
data. 
 METHODS USED IN DATA COLLECTION B.
1. Qualitative Data 
We collected qualitative data for RCB acquisition, maintenance, and life-cycle 
logistics from interviews with SMEs at Naval Sea Logistics Center, PEO Ships 
PMS325G, NECC, the CCD, and Coastal Riverine Group (CRG) 2, which was 
involved in both the RCB initial acquisition and life-cycle logistics issues.  
2. Quantitative Data 
We acquired approximately 24 months of RCB supply data from the CRG-2 
supply department. This included allowancing, inventory, stock, and repair-
requisitions information. COSAL reports indicated changes in allowancing since the 
establishment of APLs. Inventory listings identified the actual stock posture, 
compared to allowance levels; this enabled analysis on inventory shortages and 
excesses. Just as the lack of an item indicated a possible supportability problem, 
any oversupply was taken as a possible indication of inefficiencies. Constrained 
funds spent on excessive inventory could have been used for readiness issues. 
Among other requisition data, CRG-2 provided unclassified casualty report 
(CASREP) information that identified items that were implicated in unit readiness 
issues.  
 DATA-COLLECTION QUESTIONS C.
The issues identified in RDML Lewis’s communication drove the data-
collection strategy. This research posed questions to SMEs to frame the problem, 
identify root causes, and propose a solution, as follows:  
1. End User/NECC 
 What are the RCB readiness concerns? 
 How is inventory level determined? 
 What is the inventory source (DLA, NAVSUP, GSA)?  
 What is the funding source? 
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 How is allowancing determined? 
 What are the requirements? 
 How is allowancing managed? 
 What are the procurement issues? 
 How does the weapon system interface with the supply system? 
 Is there a managed COSAL for the individual units? 
 Is this weapon system similar to any other supply-supported 
weapon system? 
 What commands are the end users? 
 What are the command RCB requirements? 
 What is the requisition process? 
2. CCD/Navy PMS325G (Program Office): 
 How were requirements for the RCB identified? 
 How was the GSA determined as the best method for acquisition? 
 What is the process for allowancing a new weapon system? 
 Would there be any substantial costs in supporting a new weapon 
system? 
 What would the DLA role be in procuring and allowancing? 
 How was program support data (PSD) initiated? 
 What is the cost for a PSD? 
 OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY D.
The critical question in this research is what aspects of RCB operational 
availability were hindered by lack of maintenance and supportability, and what 
solutions can be promoted in future rapid acquisitions. It would be beneficial to 
identify situations where limited resources were spent on items that were purchased 
because of improvised procurement actions. 
 SUMMARY E.
In the first three chapters, we briefed the acquisition of the RCB and 
presented the research problem. We cited pertinent laws, policies, and procedures 
and provided the research methodology. The following chapters present a data 
analysis and the recommendations of this study. 
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The hypothesis of this research was that RCB readiness was compromised 
by lack of a life-cycle strategy, because of its rapid acquisition. Our analysis shows 
this omission could have been avoided had an LCSP been initiated as late as 
August 2008, upon the delivery of the second RCB. When the RCBs deployed to 
U.S. Central Command in January 2012, the COSAL contained fewer than twenty 
records, or less than 5% of the total parts cataloged for the RCB. Yet after 18 
months of tracking requisitions and submitting COSAL feedback reports, the number 
of NSN items increased to over 250 (D. Ellington, personal communication, 
September 2013). Extrapolated out, the supply system should be able to support the 
RCB by mid-2015, 36 months after RDML Lewis expressed his concerns. Figure 6 
shows the time line of the RCB. 
 
Figure 6. RCB Time Line 
If requisition demand data had first been passed to NAVSUP after delivery of 
the second RCB in August 2008, it is a reasonable assumption that a majority of the 
required parts would have been transferred to NSNs and been available in the 
supply system before the RCBs’ first deployment. This would have assisted 
readiness because the availability of parts in the supply system would have provided 
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lead-time of commercial vendors, the warfighter could have expedited urgent 
requirements through the more robust supply system. 
This analysis is divided into three areas. First is a close study of the problem 
to understand why the LCSP was not a part of the RCB acquisition. This is followed 
by a review of the RCB LCSP evolution after the problem was brought to flag-level 
attention in April 2012, when the RCB was deployed to CENTCOM. A review of the 
current COSAL and challenges concludes this chapter.  
 PROBLEM ANALYSIS B.
RCB maintenance failed because it had no LCSP focus and relied on an ad-
hoc sustainment plan, from the initial delivery of RCB-X in December 2007 until the 
first CENTCOM deployment in January 2012. This research identifies three key 
enablers that led to this situation: first, the use of rapid acquisition to meet a new 
mission need; second, the availability of funding through Overseas Contingency 
Operations funding (OCO) and relaxed procurement laws from NDAA 2005; and 
third, the GSA’s ability to rapidly procure a commercially-available platform.  
1. Enablers  
a. The Requirement for Rapid Acquisition 
After the establishment of NECC in January 2006, CRG-1 submitted 
an initial requirements document to PMS 325G in August 2006. Because no existing 
commercial asset met the initial requirements, the requirements were amended in a 
November 2006 letter citing FAR Part 10.002, which directed agencies to reevaluate 
requirements if they could not be met by commercial sources. Once CRG-1 
reevaluated the requirements, it was determined that an existing commercial 
solution was available (Jordan, 2006). 
b. Availability of Funding Through OCO and Relaxed 
Procurement Legislation 
In the literature review, we discussed how the passage of NDAA 2003 
streamlined the acquisition process by facilitating communication between the 
combatant commanders, contracting, and R&D personnel, and by removing 
procurement barriers. NDAA 2005 removed additional government barriers to rapid 
deployment of available technology. These were the key enablers for RCB funding. 
c. Availability of a Platform Through the GSA  
After RCB requirements were adjusted by CRG-1 in November 2006, 
commercial procurement was ready to proceed. The GSA’s establishment of the 
RCB on a multiple-award schedule permitted the KO to simply post the RFQ to the 
GSA electronic bulletin board and contact the vendor directly. This availability 
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through the GSA, coupled with restructured requirements and access to funding, put 
acquisition on the fast track, and within six months of contract award, the first craft 
was delivered. 
2. Ad-Hoc Sustainment 
With no Navy sustainment plan, the vendor assembled an ad-hoc 
maintenance kit before deployment, consisting of vendor items. RCB training was 
coordinated commercially with the vendor by the end users of the RCB at NECC. 
This research identifies four key inhibitors in this 100% commercially-supported 
system. 
a. Initial Allowance 
No initial allowance was made for spares; the funding used to 
purchase spare parts came from the command’s operating budget. An estimated 
minimum of $1 million was expended on an initial allowance for spares (D. Ellington, 
personal communication, September 2013).2 This contradicts the P-485, which gives 
responsibility to the TYCOM, and not the end user, for procuring initial allowance 
items, thereby allowing the user to avoid spending operational funds on inventory 
(Naval Supply Systems Command [NAVSUP], 1997). 
In the P-485, however, this allowancing process is listed as applying to 
ACAT III programs and above. It does clarify funding for initial spares to ACAT III 
(and below) programs. The RCB was procured as an abbreviated acquisition 
program, as displayed in Chapter II, Table 1. 
OPNAVINST 4441.12D outlines the Navy’s guidance on spares. Figure 
7 is an overlay of what a traditional Navy sparing process would look like 
superimposed on the time line for the RCB. As shown, there are two funding 
accounts used in procuring an allowance for spares. The first is at the wholesale 
level. This is the funding used to actually procure the material to the Navy. When the 
requirements are identified 18–36 months out, Navy working-capital fund (NWCF) 
monies are used to order the material. After the material is in the Navy’s possession, 
the unit spends its procurement funds to get possession. This expenditure 
replenishes the NWCF funds that were required to procure the material.  
In the case of the RCB, this should have resulted in an inventory and 
an allowance of material to support deployment. However, the RCB was a unique 
procurement. First, the RCB-X was delivered in September 2007, only 10 months 
after the requirements document was released by CRG-1. Between ordering and the 
                                            
2 In conversation with the supply officer at CRG-1, it was confirmed that though there was no official 
requisition identified, an estimated $1 million was spent from the unit’s OPTAR account to build an 
inventory of anticipated required spares. These were procured commercially through Safe Boat, with 
no demand information fed into the supply system. 
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actual receipt of the boats, the time line was too short to establish allowances. Since 
the Navy had never used the crafts before and the OEM, Safe Boat, had no 
experience with naval requirements, projections for spares could not be made.  
A second issue is that PMS 325G was not supported by the NWCF. In 
the program files, PMS 325G, as a non-ACAT program, uses OPN funds for 
acquisition. Though PMS 325G can obligate OPN funding for three years out, the 
material requirements were still unknown at the time of acquisition (Coughlin, 2011). 
Figure 7 depicts the allowancing time line. 
 
Figure 7. RCB Allowancing Time Line  
b. No Formal Recording of Demand 
No formal procedure was in place for recording demand. When parts 
were required, they were issued from the OEM repair kit. Once a part was 
consumed, a replacement was ordered from the OEM or another commercial vendor 
to restock the kit. The problem with this process is that it left no demand fingerprint 
in the supply system to record transactions. If demand had been appropriately 
recorded, it would have shown up in the unit’s APL and in new NSNs in the supply 
system.  
Under a formal process, when a required part is not in the supply 
system, two actions should take place. First, a COSAL feedback report should be 
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generated to add an allowance; and second, a “BHJ” Military Standard 
Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) document should be submitted to 
the supply system to record the demand for a commercial item (NAVSUP, 1997).  
COSAL feedback reports are submitted by the end user through the 3-
M department. The new part populates on the APL and an allowance is established 
when the next ASI is conducted. This critical step tracks changes to the weapon 
system and ensures allowancing. For example, during an overhaul, when systems 
on a ship may be added or removed, the requirements for repair parts undergo 
changes. Some allowances may no longer be required, while new allowances may 
be needed. These changes are managed through consistent COSAL maintenance. 
In our case study of the RCB, this wasn’t happening. In May 2012, four and a half 
years after delivery of the first RCB, there were only 18 records on the APL. 
In addition to submitting a COSAL feedback report—which records 
demands by the end user and builds the APL—a “BHJ” MILSTRIP document 
records the demand for a commercial item in the supply system. Over time, as 
demand data accumulates, the Navy assigns the part number an NSN, after which 
the Navy and DoD organically support the item, and the end user no longer has to 
rely on commercial sources. In the case of the RCB, the transition from part-number 
items, carried by commercial vendors to NSN items was about 18 months (D. 
Ellington, personal communication, September 2013). 
Figure 8 is a diagram of the traditional supply requisition process that 
records demands and shows the flow of information and material from the customer 
through the 3-M system, and therefore into the supply department of the command 
and the Navy’s supply system. Figure 8 shows this process with an overlay of how 
the RCB commands procured commercial material. The component missing from 
the RCB process is a mechanism to capture and record demand. 
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Figure 8. RCB Requisition Processing  
c. Incorrect Allowance Levels  
The allowance levels determined by NECC were not based on a formal 
COSAL allowance. The operating target (OPTAR) fund was used to establish a pool 
of repair parts, and there was limited demand data available to identify the range 
and depth of inventory to procure. Later it was found that many of the items procured 
commercially for stock were not required. This resulted in an outlay of operational 
funds that could have been spent on deployment preparations. 
This outlay is known because parts were identified as excess after they 
transitioned to NSNs. One attribute of an NSN is the allowance type code (ATC). A 
NSN’s ATC is specific to the unit and assists in stocking decisions. For example, an 
ATC part 4 is a demand-based item that is required many times a month and should 
have an allowance based on historic demand; whereas, an ATC of “6” indicates an 
excess part that has no demand or is not associated with any APL, and therefore 
should not be carried (NAVSUP, 1997).  
As in the previous overhaul example, when a unit’s systems are 
updated, the parts for the old system are still on board. If no longer required, the 
parts will be flagged as excess, through COSAL maintenance in the next ASI, and 
labeled ATC 6. When this happened with the RCB, there were parts originally 
procured commercially that transitioned to NSNs, and through configuration changes 
or ATC updates, were identified as ATC 6—no longer required.  
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3. Training Issues 
The last inhibitor identified was training, which was conducted commercially 
by the vendor. Commercial training provides benefits because the Navy isn’t 
required to expend resources on items such as curriculum development, training 
platforms, instructors, or infrastructure such as buildings and classrooms. The 
training is funded by the Navy and the footprint becomes the responsibility of the 
contractor. 
However, we identified problems with the process used for the RCB. First, 
there was a problem with manning. Customarily, training is conducted with sailors 
prior to their arrival at a duty station. This enables a newly reporting sailor to hit the 
deck-plates running and immediately begin contributing to the mission of the unit by 
performing a specific job.  
Second, for RCBs, training is driven by the end user, not the Navy. The end 
user is responsible for identifying personnel in its command, who may already be 
engaged in critical jobs, and sending them away for training. For commands with fast 
deployment OPTEMPOs, this is especially challenging.  
These four issues—no initial allowance, no formal record of demand, 
incorrect allowance levels, and training issues—were major inhibitors of RCB LCSP 
and had consequences in their deployment in 2012. The impacts were magnified 
when the increased OPTEMPO of deployment precipitated maintenance needs that 
exceeded the training of the technicians. This brand-new weapon system had been 
operational for over four years and was being sent to war with an allowance of fewer 
than 20 parts. 
 LCSP EVOLUTION C.
Following the briefing between RDML Lewis and RADM Heinrich in April 
2012, the RCB allowance has grown to 255 items as of September 2013. This 
resulted from following proper supply procedures instead of issuing parts from a 
repair kit and reordering them on a purchase card. Figure 9 diagrams the revised 
requisitioning system that put the RCB on track towards sustainable readiness in 
2013. 
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Figure 9. RCB Requisition Processing (Evolved)  
The process in Figure 9 begins with the end user building a job in 
Organizational Maintenance Management System–Next Generation (OMMS–NG) to 
record work. Once the job is created, the user has the option of ordering existing 
parts, as listed on the APL, or new parts not listed. This is the first of many 
fingerprints that record demand and establish allowance levels.  
If the parts required are listed in the APL, a requisition will be sent to supply 
and processed by stock control. If the parts are not listed, the requirement is 
validated by 3-M to ensure the request is correct. Once validated, the requirement 
goes to supply for processing. 
The part request received by supply falls into one of four categories: a 
requirement for an NSN that is carried by the unit and has an allowance in-stock or 
not in-stock (I/S or NIS); an NSN that is not carried by the unit and has no allowance 
(N/C NSN); a part-number item that has an established allowance but hasn’t 
transitioned to a NSN; or a part-number item with no allowance. 
Carried NSN items represent the supply department’s stocked allowance 
items. These are either parts needed for critical repairs or demand-based parts 
carried because of a recurring demand that justifies an allowance.  
Two actions take place when a carried item is ordered. If the item is I/S, it is 
issued from supply, demand is recorded, and a replenishment item is ordered. If the 
part is NIS, a direct turn-over (DTO) requisition is released to the supply system and, 
if a replacement part has not been ordered, a stock part is ordered. A DTO 
requisition can be ordered at higher priority than a stock document, because a DTO 
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document is going straight to the work center, through the supply department, to fill 
an existing requirement—not to a shelf as stock.  
Not-carried NSNs are of particular interest to the supply department, because 
a requirement has been generated for an item not in inventory. Once confirmed as a 
valid requirement from 3-M, the supply department must determine whether a 
stocking decision should be made. The part is ordered by supply as a DTO item for 
the customer and a DHA is submitted to put a fingerprint in the supply system and 
record demand for a not-stocked item. Over time, after multiple demands, a stocking 
decision is made by supply. 
A carried part-number item is a part that the unit has an allowance for, but the 
supply system hasn’t assigned an NSN to. It is treated like a carried NSN, and 
issues are made from stock or as a DTO if NIS. The differences are, first, that the 
unit will submit a “BHJ” document to the supply system to record demand for a part 
number item and, second, if there are known commercial assets, the unit will work 
with NAVSUP to coordinate the commercial requisition.  
When the RCB was first delivered to NECC in 2007, all the parts were not-
carried part-number items, because the RCB was a commercial acquisition. Since 
there was no allowance established with the unit to stock these parts in inventory, 
and no NSN assigned, the supply system wasn’t stocking these parts.  
There are a few problems with not-carried part-number items. The first is 
availability. Since these part-number items are not in the supply system, their 
availability is limited to commercial sources. It is important that “BHJ” documents be 
submitted to capture demand and assist with the transition to a stocked NSN. The 
quicker the part number transitions, the quicker the supply system can support the 
requirement. 
The second problem is acquisitioning. For an NSN item, requisitioning is 
completed with the simple submission of a MILSTRIP document into the supply 
system. As long as funds are available in a unit’s OPTAR account and the part 
desired is available in the supply system, the part is processed. But procuring a part 
commercially, outside the supply system, presents a different set of challenges. 
Commercial procurements are made either with a government commercial 
purchase card (GCPC) or, if the price exceeds the card’s dollar limits, through FLC 
contracting. Commercial procurement allows for quick transactions, but the customer 
is dependent on the vendor and cannot expedite or track critical items as well as he 
or she can in the supply system, where items can be procured under high priority 
and tracked daily. Another issue is that demand data is not recorded. 
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 CURRENT ANALYSIS D.
1. NSN Health 
After we reviewed the initial and revised requisition process, we analyzed 
parts allowances. This was possible because of a listing from CRG-2, consisting of 
all the parts of the RCB, and a supportability analysis of these parts performed by 
the Naval Sea Logistics Center (NSLC). 
As of September 2013, there were 441 parts assigned to the RCB. The 
number of parts that were NSNs grew from 18 in April 2012 to 247 in September 
2013. In 18 months, NSN support grew from 4% to 56%. 
The NSLC supportability analysis took all the parts of the RCB and compiled 
35 pieces of information for each NSN. Among the data provided were the allowance 
type code, outstanding requisitions due, average monthly demand, stock on hand, 
date of last demand, price, acquisition advice code, and lead-time. Three metrics—
lead-time, demand, and availability—were developed from these data points to build 
a measure of the overall health of the NSNs in the RCB allowance. 
a. Procurement Lead-Time 
Consisting of two components, administrative lead-time (ALT) and 
production lead-time (PLT), procurement lead-time data reveals the time required to 
obtain items. It begins with the ALT at initiation of the requirement. The ALT is the 
administrative time needed to get the item. The PLT is the remaining time to produce 
the item, which ends with customer receipt. As displayed in Figure 10, there is large 
variance in the procurement lead-time for RCB items, with a range of 325 days, but 
most items have a lead-time between 187 and 273 days.  
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Figure 10. RCB NSN Lead-Times  
b. Demand 
Demand is an important metric because it can provide an estimate of 
what will be required in the future by looking at the past. However, for demand data 
to be relevant, it must be reported regularly to compile a sufficient data snapshot. 
The three components of the NSLC supportability analysis that help assess demand 
for an NSN are (a) items with demand, (b) monthly demand frequencies of an item, 
and (c) age of the demand data.  
We must first observe that there isn’t demand data for all items. Only 
the NSNs have records in the supportability analysis. Of the 441 parts belonging to 
the RCB, only 247 are NSNs; the analysis is looking at only 56% of the RCB parts. 
The second point is that there isn’t a lot of demand information. Of the 
247 records, only 166 have been demanded in the past 12 months, and only 38 of 
these had a monthly demand greater than one unit. There is monthly demand for 
only 15% of the RCB NSNs. Figure 11 presents a demand analysis. 
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Figure 11. RCB Demand Analysis  
c. Availability  
Material availability is an important metric for an NSN. Just as PLT is 
an indication of how long it will take to acquire something after a requirement is 
identified, and the demand for an item is an indication on how much material has 
been historically required, the availability of an item is a snapshot of current 
inventory. This is estimated by looking at a combination of previous demand, stock-
on-hand data, outstanding orders, and procurement lead-times of NSNs.  
On first glance, as displayed in Figure 11, it is apparent that there are 
192 items, or 78% of the RCB NSNs, with no stock on hand (SOH). Of these, 166 
had demand hits within the past 12 months, with an average procurement lead-time 
of 212 days. However, just because there is no SOH doesn’t mean an item is 
insufficiently stocked. 
Looking closer, there are only four NSNs with an average monthly 
demand (AMD) greater than the current stock on hand. All but one have material on 
contract in a quantity that is greater than 12 months of previous demand. 
The four NSNs with AMD greater than SOH had outstanding 
requisitions against them, but also outstanding contracts to deliver above the 
quantities of backorders. This would seem to be a good indicator of demand data 
collection, because even though the NSNs had no stock on hand, material was on 
contract to cover customer orders. However, the lead-times for these items ranged 
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from 216–334 days. Without sufficient stock on hand, it would take at least six 
months to complete the requisition. 
The availability metric is difficult to assess because it depends on the 
availability of robust demand data. Lack of formal demand, in combination with only 
56% of the total parts having been assigned an NSN, and the procurement lead-
times of the parts being mainly between 187–273 days, pulled unfavorably on the 
availability metric. Good demand data would allow managers to make accurate 
stocking decisions that would account for long procurement time lines. Without 
demand data to support procurement, procurement managers will not commit to 
buying inventory that will not move. Figure 12 depicts the RCB part availability of 
non NSN parts, NSN no stock on-hand, and NSN stock on-hand. 
 
Figure 12. RCB Part Availability  
2. Allowancing and Maintenance Evolution 
Allowance for Navy units is established based on historical demand and initial 
outfitting levels. The RCB’s initial allowances originated from OEM 
recommendations, based on the manufacturer’s parts list. As noted, demands were 
tracked manually via a spreadsheet and parts were ordered after being consumed 
from the repair kit, or as required. 
This situation evolved after initial procurement. Presently there are 441 parts 
assigned to the RCB, with 247 of these having NSNs. Most of the parts belong to 
one of two RCB deployment kits. The deployment kits evolved under sourcing issues 
for the commercial parts. 
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To requisition parts through the supply system, items must have an NSN and 
be stocked. This was an inhibitor, because it was a commercial procurement and at 
the time of its first deployment in 2012, there were only 18 NSNs assigned to the 
allowance. With so few parts available in the supply system, most had to be 
procured commercially. 
Two mechanisms used to procure parts commercially: the GCPC and 
contracting. The GCPC is for micro-purchases below $3,000 and is an efficient way 
to procure material. For items over $3,000, units must submit their requirements 
through FLC contracting, which is a much lengthier process. On the parts list for the 
RCB are 13 items that exceed the $3,000 GCPC threshold. 
As parts were transferred to NSNs but still not available in the supply system, 
NECC worked with the GSA to develop deployment kits consisting of 419 of the total 
441 RCB repair parts. Instead of submitting orders through contracting and 
experiencing lengthy delays, the deployment kits could be procured rapidly through 
the GSA, who had established contracts with vendors from whom end users could 
order. 
What makes this process successful in the long run is that items on the GSA 
deployment kit evolve to support NSNs in the supply system. When the units 
consistently submit a “BHJ” MILSTRIP document along with commercial 
procurements, a demand signal enters the supply system, which, over time, leads to 
stocking decisions for the required parts.  
a. Maintenance Evolution 
Just as the procurement of repair parts evolved from 100% commercial 
procurement to organic naval supply, the maintenance of the RCBs evolved from 
commercial to organic support. However, there was a significant period after the 
initial procurement in which usage data was not recorded. This was detrimental to 
sustainment because, as the NSN analysis revealed, there is very little demand data 
for the supported NSNs. 
Demand data is a critical metric for stocking decisions and, as 
discussed, may take three years from need to availability. It is essential that users of 
the commercial material submit DHAs and “BHJ”s to establish a record of demand.  
As the time line in Figure 8 shows, there was very little material 
transferred to organic Navy support during the first four and a half years of the RCB 
life cycle. All maintenance was done through OEM procedures and with OEM, or 
commercially procured, materials. The Navy first issued maintenance guidelines in 
January 2011. The class-maintenance plan for the RCB was published in February 
2013. This document offered overarching guidance on maintenance objectives to 
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users of the RCB at NECC. Figure 13 shows the time line when MIPs, MRCs, and 
PMS procedures were implemented, and the publication of the CMP. 
 
Figure 13. RCB Time Line (Maintenance)  
 SUMMARY E.
The RCB was a particular weapon system whose acquisition resulted from 
the Navy’s riverine mission, which has been done by the Navy since Vietnam. 
Procurement hurdles were removed to get this capability to the warfighter quickly. 
Those responsible for standing up RCB support at NECC, PMS 325G, and the CCD 
now wish to establish allowance listings and push demand requirements into the 
supply system to develop organic support.  
We reviewed the actions following the procurement of the RCB to identify 
whether things could have been done differently to allow the supply system to 
support the RCBs. 
Organizations are leery of making capital investments in inventory that may 
not move. Needed parts were not on the shelf during deployment because the 
demand was not known by the supply system. Nor are parts on the shelf now, 
because although over 56% of RCB parts have NSNs, there is still insufficient 
demand to justify stocking decisions by the supply system. The key to getting supply 
system support is to provide as much demand data as possible. This cumulative 
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The RCB has limited demand data because requirements have been 
recorded for fewer than 18 months. Unknown material requirements for the first four 
and a half years resulted in the readiness addressed by RDML Lewis; but since the 
units have been submitting requirements into the supply system, support has 
increased to 56% of the RCB’s total parts inventory. 
The RCB is a realistic example of issues to come. In the past, a procurement 
consisting of a complex weapon system with a wide range of support functions, 
including research and development, logistics, inventory, infrastructure, and 
manning, was standard. That norm is shifting to a narrow and shallower rapid 
acquisition footprint. But the challenge of life-cycle management still needs to be 
addressed. If systems are to be rapidly procured from industry, industry needs to be 
a partner in the life-cycle-sustainment plan.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this investigation, we found consistent commitment to the mission, sailors, 
and readiness of the RCB from every stakeholder contacted, from end users at 
CRG-1 to the program-manager office at NAVSEA. There has been uniform 
determination to seeing this program succeed.  
The RCB procurement was a product of a swift evolution in the acquisition 
process. Rapid acquisition differs markedly from traditional procedures, beginning 
with expectations: a rapid acquisition providing an 80% solution today is better than 
acquisition providing 100% tomorrow. The GSA was a great enabler in setting up 
rapid-acquisition capability, facilitating procurement for the DoD and the Navy, and 
acting as sole point of contact for the entire federal government. The GSA provided 
a tremendously efficient vehicle to get the RCB to the warfighter.  
However, the 20% that fell short of an excellent solution overall became a 
burden on the end user. Many unknown variables had to be identified and managed; 
for example, how long would this weapon system be around? How large a parts 
inventory should be established? What are the maintenance issues? Is there 
commonality among the various commercial parts? Which items should be stocked 
in the supply system and which commercially supported? 
These questions fell on users who were busy standing up a new riverine 
capability that hadn’t existed since Vietnam. They were trying to anticipate the 
unexpected, based on their experience and knowledge of the supply system and 
traditional acquisition that planned for life-cycle management.  
Our recommendations acknowledge these difficulties and focus on three 
areas. First, we examine the mix of commercial and organic life-cycle-support 
requirements associated with the RCB. Though originally we started with a scope of 
three attributes—acquisition, maintenance, and sustainment—we expanded this list 
to training as well. 
We reviewed the concept of leveraging risk using something similar to a 
performance-based logistics (PBL) approach, where the OEM is incentivized to 
assume risk and provide readiness while the government is developing organic 
support, working closely with the OEM.  
Our third recommendation stresses the early implementation of life-cycle 
strategies (ILS). This includes starting ILS at the beginning of an acquisition, with a 
focus on developing maintenance and sustainment processes, while documenting 
demand, to get organic support started as soon as possible.   
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 A MIX OF ORGANIC AND COMMERCIAL SUPPORT A.
The traditional LCSP was a means of gaining organic control and sustaining 
readiness. But can rapid acquisition exploit commercial efficiencies and still meet 
readiness requirements?  
The RCB procurement originated as a 100% commercial buy. The acquisition 
was conducted through the GSA, the maintenance procedures came from the OEM, 
the training of the operators and maintainers was conducted by the OEM, and the 
spare parts were procured commercially and through a GSA deployment kit. 
Though most functions of the RCB have been supported commercially, some 
are evolving towards organic support. The RCB craft is still procured commercially 
through the GSA. Training is still commercial—most recently as a sole-source 
contract to Safe Boat in March 2013. NECC awarded Safe Boat a $63,000 contract 
to train 10 sailors for three weeks on the maintenance and operation of the RCB.  
Maintenance is still partly commercial. Though conducted by crewmembers 
using organic maintenance procedures, there are still calls for tech support to assist 
with maintenance requirements beyond the scope of the OEM training. Parts support 
is done with a mix of hybrid and commercial support. Five years after the RCB-X 
was delivered, 44% of parts are still commercially supported. Again, the question is 
whether this process can successfully meet readiness requirements. 
Our conclusion is that yes—mixtures of commercial and organic support can 
support the RCB and meet readiness requirements. We review four life-cycle 
functions—acquisition, maintenance, sustainment, and training—and recommend 
using either commercial, organic, or a hybrid of both. 
1. Acquisition 
The need for a rapid boat acquisition was met through a successful 
commercial procurement. The RCB was designated as an abbreviated acquisition 
program per SECNAVINST 5000.2e and a commercial purchase under FAR Part 12, 
made available for procurement through the GSA. These allowed the purchase to 
bypass lengthy ACAT programs, and get the goods to the warfighter—but they didn’t 
address life-cycle sustainment.  
a. Benefits 
Commercial acquisition allowed RCB-X to be delivered three months 
after ordering, and three and a half years from first order in June 2007 to the last 
delivery in December 2010. 
In addition to the advantage of the actual boats being available on the 
GSA schedule, multiple options allowed the tailoring of the RCB to the needs of the 
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organization placing the order. These options included everything from armor to 
communications equipment, to repair kits to provide an allowance of spares to 
training for operators and technicians.  
b. Risks 
The backbone of this project can be boiled down to the risks of 
supportability for this commercial procurement. With everything available 
commercially, there was no organic support established for the life-cycle 
sustainment of the RCB. With traditional weapon systems, life-cycle support is 
developed during procurement. With rapid acquisition, the 20% missing from a 
satisfactory procurement solution is mainly life-cycle considerations. 
c. Recommendations  
Awareness of life-cycle problems under rapid procurement is the first 
step towards developing a life-cycle plan. The RCB contracts attempted to address 
this concern. Each contract had additional line items for the procurement of 
maintenance/operator training, additional spare parts, and tech data. These critical 
investments should never be overlooked. The maintenance/operator training 
ensures that there will be an organic force available to keep the boats operational. 
The outlay in spare parts is critical to establish an allowance that will support 
maintenance requirements, because at the time of the acquisition there was no 
supply-system support for the RCB. The tech data that was procured with each RCB 
gives the government access to information that will allow development of organic 
capabilities. For example, the part numbers and manufacture information of RCB 
components is needed to submit the “BHJ” MILSTRIP documents to the supply 
system.  
Over $900,000 was spent on the contract line items training, tech-data, 
and spares. The purpose of these expenditures was to ensure readiness and bridge 
the time line between commercial support provided by the OEM and organic support 
provided by the supply system. While there was this initial outlay of funds for support, 
there was no follow-through once the boat arrived to the squadrons, no stock 
number assigned, no demand data captured, and limited maintenance development.  
2. Maintenance 
Readiness requirements drive the development of an organic maintenance 
capability. The ability to overcome the hurdles that are presented with a rapid 
acquisition must be identified and addressed at the earliest stages of acquisition. 
Benefits and risks of the commercial maintenance practices with the RCB are as 
follows. 
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a. Benefits 
The commercial maintenance practices on the RCB had benefits. First, 
this was a new system and the Navy didn’t have an established maintenance 
process. They developed their maintenance doctrine from the provided OEM 
manuals and training. 
Second, both sides were learning together. The Navy was learning 
how to maintain and operate this new piece of equipment and the OEM was learning 
how its system responded to the unique demands of naval operation. The 
knowledge base was growing on both sides as the RCB was integrated into riverine 
operations. 
b. Risks 
The unique forward-deployed operating environments of the RCB 
drove the need for an organic maintenance capability. The crew and those attached 
to the unit didn’t have the luxury of reaching back for commercial support when 
forward deployed. Readiness depends on the organization’s ability to quickly fix an 
out-of-commission unit and get it back in the fight.  
This requires an organic capability at the organizational level and 
increases the size of the RCB logistical footprint. This capability doesn’t develop 
overnight, and the time line requires early identification in the acquisition process.   
c. Recommendation 
The drive for the gain of organic support starts at acquisition. The 
maintenance component needs to aggressively identify what maintenance 
capabilities need developing and start developing them early. The RCB contracts 
tried to do this by ordering additional repair parts and buying tech data with each 
RCB. This set the stage for organic support. The missing component was robust 
demand information that would not be available until after the RCBs were 
operational. 
The Navy takes a lot of risk in the maintenance component of this 
situation. How can this risk be leveraged to ensure readiness? The establishment of 
a performance-based-logistics type contract with the OEM could provide incentives 
to the OEM for performance and shift risk away from the Navy. 
Performance-based logistics (PBL) is an option used in new 
acquisitions to cover the period before organic sustainment is viable (Devries, 2005). 
The goal of a PBL contract is to increase reliability (readiness) while lowering costs 
(Doerr, Lewis, & Eaton, 2005). For the RCB, the OEM would be given incentive to 
maintain a certain readiness level while the Navy gathered data to develop organic 
support.  
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3. Sustainment 
Historically, sustainment costs have represented 60–80% of the total life-
cycle costs of a weapon system after procurement (Murphy & Taylor, 2012). The 
material requirements to sustain the RCB were commercially procured because the 
supply system did not have an organic capability. Even in October 2013, nearly 
three years after the last RCB was delivered to the unit, the supply system had just 
over 50% of the 400-plus parts assigned as NSNs in the supply system. 
A review of the RCB contracts shows commercial procurement of supply 
parts was an essential component of the RCB sustainment. As Figure 14 reveals, 
over $498,000 was obligated to the OEM for spares procurement.3  
 
Figure 14. RCB Cost Breakdown  
a. Benefits 
There are several benefits associated with the commercial 
procurement of sustainment requirements from the OEM. First, this was an overall 
small weapon system with very little established demand. Even after half of the part 
numbers became NSNs, there was very little demand for these items to justify 
stocking decisions by the DLA or NAVSUP. The OEM was a critical partner in RCB 
sustainment because it could maintain the small, slow-moving inventory more 
efficiently than the supply system. 
Another benefit was the partnership of the GSA. One problem with 
open procurement of repair parts is cost. Unless the cost is under the micro-
                                            
3 Data for Figure 14 comes from a culmination of the RCB contracts. It is not all inclusive of all OEM 
procured spares or training, only representative of the material procured at the time of the contract. 
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purchase threshold of the GCPC, the parts have to be procured through contracting. 
This means that even if a vendor had the parts on the shelf, a request from the end 
user would be submitted to contracting, where it would be put out for bids from 
various vendors. This results in long lead-times and delays for critical repair parts.  
The GSA established a customized deployment kit for NECC to 
counter this contracting problem. The GSA did the work of the contracting office and 
offered options for end users to select through their website. The advantage of this 
kit for the GSA was availability to all government users of the RCB, not just the Navy. 
The advantage for NECC was that they could quickly order their high-dollar 
deployment kits and not worry about lengthy contracting delays (D. Ellington, 
personal communication, September 2013).4  
A third benefit of using the OEM to procure repair parts is the 
improvement of the life cycle of the repair parts. Having access to the unit-demand 
signals of the end user provides valuable data that the manufacturer can use to 
improve the life cycle of the parts. If the OEM is incentivized by performance metrics, 
the demand data can drive it to make design improvements. This is a win–win, 
where performance improvements result in increased unit readiness. 
b. Risks 
In the supply system, it is easier to expedite organic parts than it is to 
expedite commercial parts. The supply system has greater transparency as to what 
is available, and there are several metrics that can assist with decision-making. In 
addition to inventory, the supply system provides demand history, lead-time to 
procure additional stock, and status on outstanding orders. 
With a commercial procurement, there is competition among other 
external market demands. There is only so much influence that can be leveraged on 
a commercial vendor who is incentivized by maximizing profit, not user readiness. 
Commercial parts procurement carries the responsibility to report 
demand to the supply system. After a commercial part number transitions to a 
supply system NSN, it still needs to have demand data before being carried. This is 
identified through the acquisition advice code of a NSN. A commercial item initially 
has an advice of “J,” and once sufficient demand signals have been received in the 
system it will transition to a “D” and become a stock supply-system part. As 
discussed in Chapter IV, demand is recorded by submitting a DHJ document in the 
supply system (NAVSUP, 1997). 
                                            
4 Through personal communications, the assistant supply officer at CRG-2 explained the process of 
procuring critical commercial repair parts that were not carried in the supply system but that exceeded 
the GCPC threshold. 
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A third risk with commercial sustainment support is that no initial 
allowance of repair parts is established. With the RCB, an ad-hoc allowance was put 
together by the end users based on the OEM’s recommended repair kits. Because 
the units were not funded through the Navy working-capital fund (NWCF), it resulted 
in an outlay of the unit’s own operating funds, which could have been used to 
support other mission requirements. The RCBs had to outlay operational funds to 
procure an inventory of anticipated repair parts. 
c. Recommendations 
The RCBs are a very small population in the supply-system inventory. 
This resulted in supply-system reluctance to make outlays for stock inventory that 
might not move. Additionally, the RCB is part of a command that was stood up to 
support a specific conflict. If there is uncertainty that the mission will persist, the 
supply system is reluctant to invest in inventory. 
Readiness depends on the effective communication of demand. The 
more demand communicated to the supply system, the sooner the material is carried 
in inventory. Big-ticket items that are critical and hard to procure should be identified 
to ensure availability. If the supply system does not provide inventory support, other 
means are needed to ensure readiness is maintained. 
d. Incentivize the OEM 
If the OEM is incentivized by performance metrics, it will leverage 
readiness gains. The OEM will pursue innovative ways to keep items operational. 
This innovation can be exploited by the end user to increase readiness. The result is 
beneficial all around. 
4. Training  
A sole-source contract was awarded in March 2013 to Safe Boat for 
instructional and technical support of the RCB. Over two and a half years after 
delivery of the last RCB, training is still done commercially. 
a. Benefits 
Commercial training makes sense. The RCB community is small, with 
only eight boats, and it may be cost-prohibitive to establish a naval training program 
for such a small population. Traditional training would require facilities, instructors, 
and training materials. This would increase the size of the RCB footprint and add 
layers between the technicians/operators and the craft.  
Because of the RCB’s small population, it would be a challenge to find 
organic Navy assets such as instructors who have current knowledge of the craft. 
Also, in such a community, the sailor best capable of providing training is probably 
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better tasked to serve as an operational operator or technician. Outsourcing RCB 
training lets the Navy make better use of personnel. 
OEM-provided training eliminates the Navy training footprint while 
providing the sailor with current instruction from the OEM, ensuring the curriculum is 
up to date, and ensuring that relevant instruction is available.  
b. Risks 
There are two risks in commercial training. First, there is no guarantee 
that the training performed by the OEM will be applicable and relevant to unit 
requirements. This concern is addressed in the contract by assigning a contracting-
officer’s representative (COR) to work with the OEM and ensure suitability. 
Second, where sailors are drawn from to attend the training is an 
important question. Are they sent to RCB training before reporting to their command, 
or is the command drawing from available personnel to fill requirements? 
Training is critical to readiness objectives. However, a unit that is 
preparing for deployment or already deployed may not have the manning capacity to 
send a top sailor away for a three-week course.  
c. Recommendations 
The Navy should continue using the OEM to provide training because 
of the footprint required to establish organic training. Moreover, the OEM is the 
expert and would provide the most relevant training, assuming the monitoring of the 
COR.  
However, there are real manning issues to be addressed. If sending 
sailors to training is detrimental to unit readiness, they should be trained before 
reporting to their command. Candidates could be identified through screening by 
CRG-1. This would ensure quality sailors for training while not drawing from the 
command.  
 LEVERAGING RISK B.
A performance-based logistics (PBL) contract incentivizes the OEM to 
perform. This is particularly beneficial with a new weapon system that has little or no 
organic support. In the early phases of the system’s life cycle, the risk for 
performance is carried by the OEM as the user develops organic support. 		 
1. Use of a PBL Contract 
According to DoD Directive 5000.01 (OUSD[AT&L], 2007), an evaluation by 
the program manager for the use of a PBL contract should be done for each weapon 
system, to determine its implementation and whether it should be provided by the 
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public or private sector. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) PBL guide (DAU, 
2005) points out that the goal is to reduce the logistical cost of a system over its life 
cycle and find the right strategy mix for success. There are many types of PBLs, 
from completely organic to totally contractor supported, as indicated in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15. Spectrum of PBL Strategies  
(DAU, 2005, p. 2-3) 
2. The Keys to a Successful PBL Contract 
Since a PBL contract is built on performance, it is imperative that a proper 
metrics system be developed and identified for use during initial JCIDS development. 
The DAU PBL guide uses these five metrics as objectives identified by the 
OUSD(AT&L; 2004): 
1. Operational availability 
2. Operational reliability 
3. Cost-per-unit usage 
4. Logistics footprint 
5. Logistics response time (p. 2-5) 
A PBL contractor’s goal should be to achieve these performance metrics; it is 
not the government’s responsibility to tell the contractor how. Each performance 
metric should be tailored to the needs of the end user. Three out of five of those 
above are the exact issues that were reported as a problem for the RCB.  
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3. PBL for the RCB 
The RCB was procured with initial contract by the PEO PMS 325G in June 
2007 and delivery in August of 2008. The RCB went operational in October of the 
same year; with only 16 months, there was limited time for LCSP implementation. A 
PBL for life-cycle support could have improved the chances of RCB operational 
availability. The contractor who awarded the PBL contract would have been required 
to create SOPs for maintenance and ILS data gathering. The data would have been 
used by the supply system to generate organic support. The time line in Figure 16 
represents a hypothetical implementation of a PBL contract.  
 
Figure 16. RCB Time Line (PBL Contract Support)  
A PBL contract is based on performance outcomes, rather than procurement 
of actual products (DAU, 2005). In accordance with FAR 37.602, a PBL contract 
contains three devices to promote success: a performance work statement so the 
contractor knows what is expected, an ability to measure performance against 
specific standards, and incentives to motivate the contractor to reach those 
standards. For the RCB, this could require the contractor of a PBL contract to be 
able to bring the RCB back to 100% operational within 48 hours of initial report while 
deployed, and 24 hours when in home port. This must be accomplished at least 95% 
of the time. If the contractor accomplishes these tasks, a full-award fee is paid, but if 
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 EARLY IMPLEMENTATION C.
The two keys to a successful rapid LCSP implementation are as follows: 
1. Implement ILS Early 
Chapter IV indicates no ILS was implemented at the beginning of the RCB 
procurement. The RCB was delivered with an initial spare kit and tech data, but the 
indications are that ILS support wasn’t started until 2012, after the boat was on 
deployment. When parts were needed for maintenance, they were open-purchased 
by the command. Had ILS support been established at the initial acquisition phase of 
procurement in 2007, much of its life-cycle support would have been in place before 
the first RCB deployment in 2012.  
2. Track and Record Demand Early  
The key to getting material organically stocked is simple: track and record 
demand early. This allows the supply system to begin generating organic support. 
 SUMMARY D.
We brought forward the RCB life-cycle issues with the e-mail between Rear 
Admiral Lewis and Rear Admiral Heinrich. This report focused on how the RCB’s 
LCSP should have been implemented based on laws, policies and procedures. We 
reviewed the data on maintenance and part requisition to understand the impact of 
the lack of LCSP. Finally, we provided recommendations that could have benefited 
the RCB, and more importantly, can be used for future rapid acquisition and the 
implementation of rapid LCSP.    
 FURTHER RESEARCH E.
The RCB is approaching the end of its useful service, and the time is nearing 
for the acquisition of the Mark VI as the replacement. Further study on how and 
when the maintenance and life-cycle support was established for the Mark VI as 
compared to the RCB would be beneficial in identifying the improvements. 
Another avenue of further research is a cost–benefit analysis on the 
contracted training for the maintenance and operation of the RCB versus an organic 
training system. NECC has yet to bring the training for the RCB into its organic 
capabilities and requires yearly contractor support. Cost savings could be identified if 
a program such as training the trainer or total organic training could be achieved.  
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